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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of un-
employment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we rst develop a theoretical model
based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pis-
sarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints not only
increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We then
provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 19 OECD countries. Our
results suggest that credit market imperfections would signicantly increase the persistence of
unemployment.
Keywords: Credit markets; labor markets; unemployment; credit constraints; search fric-
tions.
Résumé
Dans ce papier, nous montrons que les imperfections sur marché du crédit impactent non
seulement le niveau du chômage, mais aussi sa persistance. En premier lieu, nous développons
un modèle théorique dappariement à la Mortensen et Pissarides (1999) et Pissarides (2000)
dans lequel nous introduisons des contraintes de crédit. Nous montrons que ces contraintes
accroissent non seulement le chômage détat stationnaire, mais aussi ralentissent la dynamique
transitoire. Nous présentons enn une illustration empirique basée sur un panel de 19 pays de
lOCDE. Nos résultats suggèrent que les imperfections sur le marché du crédit augmenteraient
signicativement la persistance du chômage.
Mots-clés: Marché du Crédit; Marché du Travail; Chômage; Contrainte de Crédit; Frictions
dAppariement.
JEL Classication: E24, E44, J08, J64
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I Introduction
An important stream of literature has dealt with the incidence of credit market imperfections on
the level of unemployment (see e.g. Acemoglu (2001) or Wasmer and Weil (2004)). These papers
explain how unemployment may be worsened by frictions outside the labor market, particularly
in the credit market. However, the way credit frictions inuence the transitional dynamics of
unemployment is not obvious. In this paper, we extend the equilibrium matching framework of
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000) by introducing credit constraints. We
show that when these constraints are binding, not only the steady-state level of unemployment is
increased, but the transitional dynamics also decelerates. We then provide an empirical illustra-
tion based on a panel of OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections
do increase the persistence of unemployment.
We rst provide a theoretical argument within a simple matching model. Wages are exoge-
nous and workers lend their money to representative banks. Building new jobs requires capital.
Entrepreneurs do not have capital on their own and thereby have to borrow from banks. Ab-
sent credit market imperfections, entrepreneurs create jobs until congestion externalities in the
recruiting process make job creation no longer protable. Our departure from the standard
matching model lies in the introduction of a credit constraint in the spirit of Matsuyama (2007):
Entrepreneurs can only borrow a fraction of pledgeable assets. When the total value of pledge-
able assets is too low, job creation is restricted. The steady state in the constrained regime is
therefore characterized by higher unemployment. Moreover, as unemployment converges to its
steady-state value, the number of jobs changes, a¤ecting the total value of pledgeable assets.
Through this channel, the transitional dynamics is slowed down, and unemployment becomes
more persistent.
To illustrate this mechanism, we perform an empirical exercise on a panel of 19 OECD
countries, during the period 1982-2003. Data were drawn from Bassanini and Duval (2006)
for the labor market institutions and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) for nancial
development variables. We observe that private credit by deposit money banks as a percentage
of GDP would be a signicant determinant of the unemployment level, in addition to the 1-period
lagged value of the unemployment rate and the traditional factors.1 Without loss of generality,
we can arguably think of this private credit variable as inversely related to the stringency of credit
constraints. Interestingly, the interaction between private credit and lagged unemployment
appears to have a signicant negative impact on the level of unemployment. Put di¤erently, the
development of private credit would signicantly lower unemployment persistence.
1These variable are: the average unemployment benet replacement rate, the tax wedge, the employment
protection legislation index, the union density index, the degree of co-ordination of wage bargaining, the product
market regulations index and the output gap.
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Our contribution follows the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of credit market
frictions. The seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
explain how credit market frictions amplify business cycle uctuations through a nancial ac-
celerator mechanism. However, they assume away labor market imperfections, and in particular
matching unemployment. Acemoglu (2001) investigates how credit constraints can a¤ect the
dynamics of unemployment, and argues that credit market imperfections increase the level and
persistence of unemployment. In his model, credit frictions induce some individuals that are
skilled enough but without su¢ cient wealth to be workers rather than entrepreneurs. In our
model, credit frictions inuence more specically the volume of credit devoted to job creation.
Wasmer and Weil (2004) introduce search frictions in both the labor and credit markets. Their
focus is on the complementarity between the two frictions, not upon the transitional dynamics.
Our empirical exercise is in line with the literature that investigates the empirical determinants of
the time patterns of unemployment in OECD countries (see e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (2000),
Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2005), Belot and Van Ours (2004), Bassanini and Duval (2006),
Bertola, Blau and Kahn (2006)). In a recent paper, Gatti and Vaubourg (2009) try to assess
the impact of credit market imperfections on the level of unemployment. We depart from their
work by analyzing also the e¤ect of credit development on the persistence of unemployment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is exposed in Section
II. Section III provides an empirical illustration of the impact of credit frictions on unemployment
persistence. Some concluding comments and directions for further research are gathered in
section IV.
II The model
Time is continuous and goes forever. The economy consists of three types of risk-neutral agents:
workers, entrepreneurs and banks, who all discount future at a common rate  > 0. Workers
can be either employed or unemployed, and lend their savings to banks. Entrepreneurs own jobs
that are either vacant or lled. They have no personal capital, so they need banks to nance
the creation of new jobs. Competition among banks is perfect.
II.1 Matching technology
There is a unit mass of workers that are either employed or unemployed. Let L be the number of
employed workers, so there are 1 L unemployed workers. The total mass of jobs is endogenous.
Jobs can be either lled or vacant and require an exogenous amount of k units of goods (capital).
L also equals the number of lled jobs. Let V be the (endogenous) number of vacant jobs. The
matching function Q (U; V ) expresses the ow of hiring per unit of time as the function of the
number of unemployed workers and vacancies. We assume that Q (:; :) is increasing and concave
4
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with respect to both arguments and that Q (:; :) exhibits constant returns to scale.2 We in
addition assume that Q (:; :) is continuously di¤erentiable over R2+. Let  = V= (1  L) denote
the tightness on the labor market.
The rate at which a vacancy meets a worker is given by Q (U; V ) =V = Q (1=; 1)
def q ().
From the assumptions we made about the matching function, we deduce that q (:) is a decreasing
and di¤erentiable function of . The rate at which an unemployed worker exits unemployment
is Q (U; V ) =U = q (). This rate is an increasing and di¤erentiable function of . Finally, jobs
are dissolved exogenously at rate  > 0.
The level of employment (the number of lled jobs) evolves according to:
_L = q ()  (1  L)    L (1)
In steady state, this gives the Beveridge Curve
L =
q ()
 + q ()
(2)
This curve denes an upward-sloping and convex curve labelled (BC) in the (L; ) plan (see
Figure 1 ). When the economy is located in the left (resp. in the right) of BC curve, L increases
(decreases), so the economy moves rightwards (leftwards).
II.2 Workers
They receive the exogenous wage w when employed and 0 income when unemployed. They
enjoy consumption thanks to a linear utility function and they deposit their savings at the
banks. Hence savings are innitely elastic in the interest rate, so banks generate revenue at the
workersdiscount rate .
II.3 Entrepreneurs
A lled job produces a ow y > w of production. Let r be the (endogenous) interest rate, so
the ow of reimbursment equals r  k. The value J of a lled job for an entrepreneur veries the
asset equation:
  J = y   w   r  k     J + _J (3)
A vacant job neither yields cost nor gain. It is lled at the Poisson rate q (). The value Jv of
a vacancy thus veries the asset equation:
  Jv = q () (J   Jv) + _Jv (4)
2See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001)
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II.4 Banks
When a bank is in contact with a lled job, it receives a ow r  k of reimbursment. Since the
job is dissolved at the Poisson rate  > 0 and the bank nances itself at rate , the value B for
a bank to be in contact with a lled job veries the asset equation
 B = r  k    B + _B (5)
When a bank is in contact with a vacant job, the latter is unable to pay back its debt until the
job becomes lled. Therefore, the value Bv of a bank to be in contact with a vacant job veries:
 Bv = q () (B  Bv) + _Bv (6)
Perfect competition in the banking sector decreases the lending interest rate r until the zero-
prot condition Bv   k = 0 in the banking sector is met. This last condition pins down Bv = k
and _Bv = 0. Therefore, the interest rate adjusts so that, at each point in time:
B = k

1 +

q ()

(7)
Summing (3) and (5) gives
(+ ) (J +B) = y   w + _J + _B
J+B equals the total value of a lled job for the bank and the entrepreneur. It yields a constant
prot that equals output y minus wage w and is dissolved at rate . This equation featuring
forward-looking variables is unstable. Assuming away bubbles implies at each point in time:
J +B =
y   w
+ 
(8)
II.5 Job creation
There are two constraints on the job creation.
1. Assume that creating a vacant job induces a once-for-all disutility cost c  0. The net
gain of creating a job should be nonnegative, so Jv  c. If this constraint is binding, then
Jv = c permanently and _Jv = 0. Using (4) imply that at each point in time
J = c

1 +

q ()

This expression combined with with (7) and (8) gives :
y   w
+ 
 (c+ k)

1 +

q ()

(9)
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As in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), this relation denes a tightness level independently
of the employment level. Hence in the (L; ) plan, this curve is horizontal. Below, tightness
is lower, so Jv is higher than c and entrepreneurs want to create more vacancies.3
2. Banks require collateral to lend money. More specically, a fraction 1= of the lending
is required as collateral. This puts an upper limit on the stock of credit k (V + L). We
assume that lled jobs are the only collateralized asset in this economy. Therefore, the
credit constraint writes:
k (V + L)    L  (J +B)
since in case of default by the entrepreneurs, the bank remains the nancier of the job
(and as such values the job B) but can also resell the job to another entrepreneur (and as
such values the job J as well). In the limit case where  tends to innity, entrepreneurs do
not need collateral to borrow. Using V =  (1  L) and (8), the credit constraint implies
at each point in time:4
 


k
y   w
+ 
  1

L
1  L (10)
Whenever (9) and (10) hold with strict inequality, entrepreneurs nd protable to create
additional vacancies and are able to borrow additional credit. The number of vacancies then
instantaneously rises, pushing tightness  upwards. The right-hand side of (9) and the left-hand
side of (10) increase. Therefore, entrepreneurs create vacancies until one of the two constraints
binds. So, at each point in time:
 = min

q 1

(c+ k) (+ )
(y   w)  ((c+ k) (+ ))

;


k
y   w
+ 
  1

L
1  L

(11)
The rst term in the right-hand side does not depend upon employment , while the second
increases with employment. Therefore, in the (L; ) map, Equation (11) can be depicted by a
curve which is rst increasing (corresponding to the constrained regime) and then horizontal
(corresponding to the unconstrained regime) (See the curves labeled JC in Figure 1).
If the credit constraint (10) is not binding, Equation (9) holds with equality, which determines
 at each point in time, thereby at the steady state. Then the level of employment converges to
its stationary value according to (1). The speed of convergence is given by  + q ().
Assume now that the credit constraint (10) is binding. Therefore, one has
 =


k
y   w
+ 
  1

L
1  L (JC)
This denes an upward-sloping and convex relationship in the (L; ) map, which tends to 0 as
L tends to 0 and tends to 1 when the economy converges to full employment.
3Equation (9) resembles the protability constraint in Matsuyama (2007).
4Equation (10) resembles the borrowing constraint in Matsuyama (2007).
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Figure 1: Steady-state stability
At a steady state, using (2) to substitute L in (10) leads to

q ()
=

k
y   w
+ 
  1 (STS)
The left-hand side increases in , so a constrained steady state is unique.5 Hence, apart from
the trivial L =  = 0 steady state, the JC and BC curves intersect only once in Figure 1, such
an intersection dening a steady-state equilibrium. Moreover, when productivity y increases, or
when the wage w or the level of capital required to create a job k decrease, or when nancial
market improves (so that  increases) tightness increases. Since the JC curve moves upwards
as y or  increases6 or w or k decreases, the BC curve has to be steeper than the JC curve to
be consistent with the static comparative properties of the steady state, as Figure 1 illustrates.
Finally, since the economy lies in the JC curve at any point in time when the credit constraint
is binding, the (non-trivial) steady state is stable.
We now examine whether unemployment is more or less persistent when the credit constraint
(10) is binding. Since the job creation condition under credit constraint (JC) holds at each point
in time, plugging (JC) into (1) leads to (see Appendix A):
@ _L
@L
=   ( + q ()) + (1   ())  q ()
L
5Recall that q (:) is decreasing in  over R+ . Let us denote q = lim
 7!1
q () and q = lim
 7!0
q (), with 0  q < q 
+1. Existence holds if and only if

q
<


k
y   w
+ 
  1

<

q
where it is understood that =q = +1 if q = 0 and =q = 0 if q = +1.
6When nancial market improves (higher ), only the constrained part of the JC curve shifts upwards. Hence
the kink moves leftwards and the horizontal part remains at the same height, contrary to what is represented in
Figure 1, which corresponds to changes in y, w and k.
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where  () =  q0 () =q () 2 (0; 1) denotes the elasticity of the matching function Q (:; :) with
respect to the stock of unemployment. In steady state
@ _L
@L
=   ()  ( + q ())
Thus, employment converges at a lower rate to its steady-state value when the economy is
credit constrained. To understand why, let us denote by L () = q () = ( + q ()) the level of
employment which equilibrates labor inows and outows. When tightness  is constant, which is
the case in the unconstrained regime, employment converges in an autoregressive fashion towards
its stationary target L (). Conversely, in the constrained regime, tightness  increases in L, as a
rise in employment increases the stock of collateralized assets. Then, when employment is below
(above) the L () target, employment increases (decreases) for the same ow-rebalancing
reason as in the unconstrained regime. However, this increase (decrease) in turn implies an
increase (decrease) of the L () target. As a matter of fact, the convergence towards the steady
state is delayed, explaining why employment will converge at a slower pace in the constrained
regime.
To x ideas on how important is the persistence di¤erence between the two regimes from a
quantitative viewpoint, let us recall that around the steady state, the speed of convergence is
given by  + q () in the unconstrained regime and  () ( + q ()) in the constrained regime.
According to Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001),  () = 0:5 is the most plausible value for the
elasticity of the matching function. Hence, the speed of convergence towards the same steady
state (i.e. with the same ) would be twice smaller under credit constraints. Moreover, since
the constrained regime is associated with lower values of tightness, the speed of convergence
would be even slower. We are therefore condent that credit constraints have an important
quantitative impact on unemployment persistence.
III Empirics
In this section we investigate empirically, on macro-panel data, the impact of the credit market
development on the level and persistence of unemployment. The analysis is carried out on
19 OECD countries7 over the period 1982-2003. Data were drawn from Bassanini and Duval
(2006) for the labor market institutions and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) for nancial
development variables.8
7Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
8The denitions and description of the variables are in Appendix.
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III.1 Estimated models
To test whether credit market imperfections increase unemployment persistence, we compare
the estimates of the following three equations.9
URi;t =   URi;t 1 +  Xi;t + i + t + "i;t (12a)
URi;t =   URi;t 1 +  Xi;t +   CREit + i + t + "i;t (12b)
URi;t =   URi;t 1 +  Xi;t +   CREi;t (12c)
+   CREi;t   CRE  URi;t 1   UR+ i + t + "i;t
where URit is the aggregate rate of unemployment, URi;t 1 the lagged rate of unemployment,
i and t are country- and time-xed e¤ects. Xi;t is a vector of standard unemployment deter-
minants in the literature. It here includes the average unemployment benet replacement rate
(ARR), the degree of coordination of wage bargaining (CORP ), the union membership rates
(UNDENS), the tax wedge (TW ), the degree of employment protection legislation (EPL),
the average degree of stringency of product market regulation (PMR), and the OECD measure
of output gap (OGAP ) which particularly aims at controlling for the unemployment e¤ects of
aggregate demand uctuations over the business cycle (see e.g., Bassanini and Duval 2006).
Equation (12a) is our benchmark where unemployment is explained only by its lagged value
and other standard determinants in the literature. The coe¢ cient  of the lagged value is our
empirical measure of unemployment persistence.
We capture in Equation (12b) the e¤ect of the nancial market development on the level of
unemployment by introducing an indicator of the stringency of credit constraints: the share of
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (CRE). It measures isolated credit issued to the
private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it
concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank. It is a measure of the
activity of nancial intermediaries in one of its main function: channeling savings to investors.
The higher this indicator, the less stringent credit constraints. Credit market frictions may have
a steady-state e¤ect on unemployment which is captured by coe¢ cient  in (12b).
Moreover, we introduce in Equation (12c) an interaction term between credit market im-
perfection and lagged unemployment. UR and CRE respectively stand for the means of un-
employment rates and of the share of private credit by deposit money banks in GDP over the
whole sample. The coe¢ cient  thus specically captures how credit market imperfections in-
uence unemployment persistence, while their e¤ect on steady-state unemployment is captured
by parameter .
9The constant term is here implicitely included either in the contry-specic e¤ects, or in the time-specic
e¤ects.
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Since we exploit similar OECD data for labor market institutions, we follow Bassanini and
Duval (2006) and use the Generalized Least Square estimation method allowing for heteroscedas-
tic errors. Doing so, we are also consistent with the methodology of Nickell et al. (2005), on a
di¤erent set of data. Country-xed e¤ects i capture unobserved heterogeneity between coun-
tries, while time-xed e¤ects t control for world trends and business cycle.
Institutional variables Xi;t and CREi;t are time-varying. Changes in unemployment may
cause potential policy reactions that would a¤ect these variables. This could generate simul-
taneous biases, so that an indentication issue arises and we have to rely on an instrumental
2SLS approach. This problem potentially concerns all the variables in the right-hand side of
Equations (12). However, since our particular focus is on credit market imperfections, we only
instrument CREi;t (in specications 12b and 12c) and
 
CREi;t   CRE
  URi;t 1   UR (in
specication 12c). For sake of methodological robustness, we provide estimates of Equations
(12) both with and without instruments.
III.2 Main results
Results (see Table 1) suggest that:
 Whatever the specication, the estimated coe¢ cient  for the one-period lagged unem-
ployment variable (URi;t 1) is signicantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level with the
expected positive sign, suggesting a strong persistence of unemployment. This result is
very robust and consistent with Nickell et al. (2005), Bassanini and Duval (2006).
 The estimated vector  of parameters associated to standard unemployment determinants
in the literature is also quite robust from specications (12a) through (12c).
- Regarding labor market institutions, the average unemployment benet replacement rate
(ARR) and the high-corporatism index (CORP ) would a¤ect the level of unemployment
in a signicant way (1% level), with the expected signs (respectively positive and nega-
tive). A more generous benet system would tend to increase the level of unemployment,
while a higher degree of coordination in wage-setting (e.g. in scandinavian economies)
would reduce it. These results are consistent with Nickell et al. (2005) and Bassanini and
Duval (2006). Moreover, they seem particularly robust to the introduction of our credit
market development variable. The signicant positive e¤ect of union density (UNDENS)
on unemployment does not seem robust to the introduction of nancial development vari-
ables. In the third specication, the tax wedge (TW ) appears as a signicant (10% level)
factor of unemployment increase, which is in accordance with previous theoretical and em-
pirical research. Employment protection legislation (EPL), whose theoretical e¤ects on
11
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Table 1: Empirical results
Dependent Variable: URi;t
Specications
(12a) (12b) (12c)
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
URi;t 1 0:77
(36:69)
0:76
(34:21)
0:72
(14:85)
0:74
(32:44)
0:40
(2:96)
ARRi;t 0:02
(2:16)
 0:02
(2:07)
0:02
(0:15)
0:02
(2:66)
0:02
(0:81)
CORPi;t  0:74
( 3:35)
 0:79
( 3:53)
 0:73
( 2:54)
 0:81
( 3:63)
 0:43
( 0:87)
UNDENSi;t 0:02

(1:95)
0:01
(1:28)
 0:03
( 1:40)
0:01
(0:79)
 0:04
( 1:37)
TWi;t 0:02

(1:73)
0:02
(1:47)
0:02
(0:75)
0:04
(2:44)
0:20
(3:09)
EPLi;t  0:37
( 2:33)
 0:39
( 2:47)
 0:19
( 0:83)
 0:49
( 2:98)
 2:04
( 2:77)
PMRi;t 0:15

(1:75)
0:12
(1:36)
 0:22
( 0:95)
0:14
(1:65)
0:72
(2:15)
OGAPi;t  0:21
( 11:27)
 0:22
( 11:40)
 0:27
( 6:74)
 0:22
( 11:70)
 0:26
( 4:79)
CREi;t  0:51
( 1:86)
 2:87
( 1:75)
  0:59
( 2:13)
  2:21
( 2:05) 
CREi;t   CRE
  URi;t 1   UR  0:08
( 2:57)
 1:62
( 3:16)
Instruments No No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Davidson and McKinnon exogeneity test
Statistic 3.81 21.85
p-value 0.05 0.00
Sargan overidentication test
Statistic 0.258 5.396
p-value 0.61 0.15
Observations 349 349 349 349 349
Estimate coe¢ cients are signicant at the 1% level if ***, 5% if **, 10% if *:
Student T-statistics are given in brackets beneath the coe¢ cients.
Nota: UR and CRE respectively stand for the means of URi;t 1 and CREi;t
Instruments used in column (3): PMRi;t 1, PUBOWNi;t 2
Instruments used in column (5): ARRi;t 1; PMRi;t 1; OGAPi;t 2; CREi;t 1; CREi;t 2
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unemployment are ambiguous (since it can decrease both unemployment entry and exit)
appears to lower unemployment.
- The coe¢ cient associated with rigidities in the goods market (PMR) is signicantly
positive, which is consistent with previous research. Rents and other non-competitive
features on the product market would tend to increase unemployment.
- The output gap measure (OGAP ) would signicantly reduce unemployment. This index
is computed as the di¤erence between the actual output of an economy and its full-
capacityproduction potential, and thus has a negative sign. A negative coe¢ cient asso-
ciated with OGAP implies that a reduction in the output gap reduces the unemployment
level. This result is theoretically consistent, and perfectly in line with Bassanini and Duval
(2006).
 The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (CRE), which we understand
as inversely related to the stringency of credit constraints, would signicantly reduce the
unemployment level. The estimated coe¢ cient  is signicantly di¤erent from zero at
the 10% level for specication (12b), and at the 5% level for specication (12c), with the
expected negative sign. Interestingly, the introduction of this variable would not change
the main ndings for specication (12a).
 The ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP would signicantly reduce the
unemployment persistence (1% level). The estimated coe¢ cient  is signicantly di¤erent
from zero at the 1% level, with the expected negative sign, which gives a strong support
to our theoretical analysis. We are quite condent in the robustness of this e¤ect, since it
does not destabilize the results of specications (12a) and (12b) previously commented.
 We now turn to the possible endogeneity of credit variables CREi;t and
 
CREi;t   CRE
 
URi;t 1   UR

: Column 3 provides alternative estimates of specication (12b) using
2SLS, instrumenting CREi;t by PMRi;t 1(rst lag of the OECD Product Market Reg-
ulation Index) and PUBOWNi;t 2 (second lag of the OECD public ownership index, a
component of the PMR index measuring the scope of public enterprise, size of public
entreprise, special voting rights and control of public enterprise by legislative bodies).
Column 5 provides alternative estimates of specication (12c), instrumenting CREi;t and 
CREi;t   CRE
   URi;t 1   UR by ARRi;t 1; PMRi;t 1; OGAPi;t 2; CREi;t 1; and
CREi;t 2. The results of rst-stage within regressions are available in Table 4 and 5,
Appendix D.
The 2SLS regressions provide consistent estimates as regards the instrumented credit vari-
ables in specications 2 and 3. Though the coe¢ cients associated with the vector Xi;t of
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traditionnal unemployment determinants appear to be less signicant, they do not seem
to contradict the main results of GLS estimations.
Two tests are used to evaluate adjustment quality:
- The Davidson-McKinnon test (1993) is an adaptation to panel data econometrics with
xed e¤ects of the (Durbin-Wu-)Hausman test . It evaluates whether explanatory variables
are endogenous. If the associated p-value is equal or lower than x%, we can consider the use
of instrumental variables as necessary, with a x% error risk. The null hypothesis, which
states that an OLS xed-e¤ects model would result in consistent estimates, is rejected
at a 5% level in column 3, and at 0% level in column 5, indicating that CREi;t and 
CREi;t   CRE
  URi;t 1   UR may be endogenous.
- The Sargan test evaluates regressor exogeneity for a panel data xed-e¤ects regression
estimated via instrumental variables in which the number of instruments exceeds the num-
ber of regressors: that is, for an overidentied equation. If the associated p-value is equal
or greater that 10%, we can consider that the instruments are valid and not correlated to
the error term, with a 10% error risk. According to this criterion, the regressions whose
results are gathered in column 3 and 5 would display valid instruments, with a 10% error
risk.
These instrumental 2SLS estimations give further support to our quantitative ndings.
IV Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemploy-
ment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we rst develop our theoretical argument in a
simple model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints à la Matsuyama (2007). We show
these credit constraints not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the
transitional dynamics. We then provide an empirical illustration based on a macro-panel dataset
of 19 OECD countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections would signicantly
increase the persistence of unemployment.
Some directions for further research naturally follow. First, we want to consider alternative
measurements for the stringency of credit constraints. Second, we aim at generalizing the
analysis to the case of endogenous job destruction. Third, we plan to investigate how the
introduction of another collateralizable asset (aside from labor) would change the analysis. We
intend to pursue these projects in the soon future.
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Appendix
A Unemployment Persistence under credit constraints
Deriving (1)
@ _L
@L
=   ( + q ()) + (1  L)  @q ()
@
 @
@L

JC
=   ( + q ()) + (1  L)  q () (1   ()) 

k
y w
+   1
(1  L)2
=   ( + q ()) + q () (1   ()) 

k
y w
+   1
1  L
=   ( + q ()) + q () (1   ())  
L
where the second equality follows the derivation of (JC) and the last one stems from (JC):
B Data sources and denitions
Aggregate unemployment rate (UR)
Denition: Unemployed workers in the age group 15-64 as share of the labor force (in %).
Source : Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Average unemployment benet replacement rate (ARR)
Denition: Average unemployment benet replacement rate across two income situations
(100% and 67% of APW earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with
spouse in work) and three di¤erent unemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, and
4th and 5th years of unemployment).
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
High corporatism (CORP )
Denition: Indicator of the degree of centralisation/co-ordination of the wage bargaining
processes, which takes values 1 when wage bargaining is highly centralised or co-ordinated and
0 otherwise.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006
Union density (UNDENS)
Denition: Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers a¢ liated to a trade union, in
%.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
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Labor tax wedge (TW )
Denition: Tax wedge between the labor cost to the employer and the corresponding net
take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two children earning 100% of
APW earnings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all social security
contributions as a percentage of total labor cost.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL)
Denition: OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legisla-
tion.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Product Market Regulation (PMR)
Denition: OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market compe-
tition in seven non-manufacturing industries. The data cover regulations and market conditions
in seven energy and service industries: gas, electricity, post, telecoms (mobile and xed services),
passenger air transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight.
Source Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Output gap (OGAP )
Denition: OECD measure of the gap between actual and potential output as a percentage
of potential output.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (CRE)
Denition: CRE equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks divided by GDP.
It measures isolate credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments
and public enterprises. Furthermore, it concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other
than the central bank. It is a measure of the activity of nancial intermediaries in one of its
main function: channeling savings to investors.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001.
Public Ownership (PUBOWN)
Denition: PUBOWN is a component of the OECD Product Market Regulation Index. It
measures the scope of public enterprise, the size of public entreprise, special voting rights and
the control of public enterprise by legislative bodies.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
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C Variables description
Table 2: List of variables used in the analysis
UR : Aggregate unemployment rate
ARR : Average unemployment benet replacement rate (%)
CORP : High corporatism
UNDENS : Union density (%)
TW : Labor tax wedge (%)
EPL : Employment protection legislation
PMR : Product market regulation
OGAP : Output gap
CRE : Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP
PUBOWN : Public ownership
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis
Variable Mean Standard
devia-
tion
Minimum Maximum Number of
observa-
tions
UR (%) 7.95 4.25 0.45 24.04 349
ARR (%) 29.65 12.95 0.35 64.94 349
CORP 0.51 0.5 0 1 349
UNDENS (%) 38.64 20.84 8.2 83.14 349
TW (%) 28.22 9.19 6.41 45.5 349
EPL 2.00 1.13 0.2 4.19 349
PMR 3.66 1.31 1.05 6 349
OGAP -0.68 2.34 -10.72 6.30 349
CRE 0.75 0.34 0.18 1.65 349
PUBOWN 3.75 1.44 0.74 6 349
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D First-stage xed-e¤ects (within) regressions
Table 4: Instruments used in Column 3: rst-stage regressions
Dependant Variable:
CREi;t
URi;t 1  0:0194
(4:54)
ARRi;t  0:0062
( 3:05)
CORPi;t  0:0505
( 1:30)
UNDENSi;t  0:0077
( 3:80)
TWi;t  0:0073
( 2:48)
EPLi;t  0:0188
( 0:57)
PMRi;t  0:1436
( 3:17)
PMRi;t 1 0:1140
(2:36)
OGAPi;t  0:0160
( 4:02)
PUBOWNi;t 2  0:0909
( 4:10)
Time dummies yes
Country dummies yes
Observations 349
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Table 5: Instruments used in Column 5: rst-stage regressions
Dependant Variable:
CREi;t
 
CREi;t   CRE
  URi;t 1   UR
URi;t 1  0:0048
( 2:55)
 0:2736
( 7:39)
ARRi;t  0:0059
( 3:03)
 0:0221
(0:58)
ARRi;t 1 0:0047
(2:70)
 0:0279
( 0:81)
CORPi;t  0:0025
( 0:16)
0:1752
(0:59)
UNDENSi;t  0:0018
( 2:36)
 0:0285
( 1:95)
TWi;t  0:0012
( 1:08)
0:1140
(5:08)
EPLi;t  0:0286
( 2:14)
 1:2651
( 4:81)
PMRi;t  0:0188
( 1:06)
 0:1447
( 0:42)
PMRi;t 1 0:0147
(0:83)
0:6637
(0:96)
OGAPi;t  0:0008
( 0:50)
0:0004
(0:01)
OGAPi;t 2 0:004
(0:27)
 0:0714
(1:05)

CREi;t 1 1:4120
(29:77)
 2:5745
( 2:76)

CREi;t 2  0:5568
( 10:75)
1:4859
(1:46)
Time dummies yes yes
Country dummies yes yes
Observations 349 349
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